Introduction
The impact of the 2008 financial crisis was shortlived in Brazil. As several developing economies continued to grow well after the US economy started to cool down in 2007. That apparent decoupling with the US and Europe resumed after a quick contraction following the failure of Lehman Brothers. GDP dropped 1.9 per cent in each quarter in early 2009, but seasonally-adjusted activity had overcome the peak of 2008 by the end of 2009, resulting in -0.2 per cent change in average GDP that year and expected growth in 2010 above 7 per cent ( Figure 1 ). The two-quarter recession in 2009 followed 21 quarters of uninterrupted growth and was the shortest cycle in the last 30 years, although also the deepest.
----- Almost one million new formal jobs were created in the twelve months to December 2009. Job creation was positive in all sectors except for farming. Also the informal sector accompanied the formal market, further brightening the labor market (Table 1) . Job creation in 2010 is likely to exceed 2 million positions.
Understanding how Brazil overcame the crisis so quickly is interesting because Brazil is already the 10 th largest economy and may become the 5 th largest in the next few years. The economy was much more resilient this time than in any previous occasion in the last 25 years, and the government had instruments to react to the crisis. Therefore, as soon as it became evident that the world economic meltdown had been averted by vigorous government intervention in developed countries, the Brazilian economy reacted, also helped by confidence from foreign investors. This was translated into an economic boom, with the acceleration of infrastructure investment, and evidence that emerging markets could make a contribution to the world economic recovery.
The response of the government, made possible by the strengthening of the economy in recent years, provides a useful background to the discussion of priorities for the upcoming period. Government response, although timely and effective, implied an increased exposure of the public sector to the balance sheet of companies and was accompanied by a deterioration of the external current account balance. The impact of these risks is still limited and mitigated by several factors, such as the new oil province announced in 2008 that will provide long-term support to Brazilian exports. These favorable factors do not overshadow, however, the need for further structural reforms, especially to attain the goal of reducing distortions that still keep interest rates at high levels, and to allow the private sector to grow with less support from government. The following sections of this text review the reforms undertaken in the last 15 years and the economic standing of the Brazilian economy before the crisis, as well as the response of the government to the crisis, to sketch a balance of risks ahead and policy options to help attain the objectives above.
Initial conditions

The 1990s
Brazil has experienced important changes in the last twenty years. These changes were spearheaded by the opening of the economy in 1990, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Because inflation of more than 1000 per cent made impossible for Brazil to be competitive in a global economy, that opening forced the government to face the problem of chronic inflation, which had worsened in the 1980s. For this purpose, a clever mechanism was implemented in 1994 to stop inflation protecting the economic value of existing contracts. The underlying conditions to this transformation were a fiscal contraction in 1993-94 and increased access to external savings in 1995-97. The end of inflation also forced the consolidation of the financial sector and spurred a modern and comprehensive financial regulation, higher bank capitalization, and enhanced supervision.
Globalization helped anchor the new currency during the mid 1990s and finance long overdue investments, notably in infrastructure. In this environment, profound changes in the business sector, now facing full fledged foreign competition, fostered an increase in overall productivity. Tight monetary police, on the other hand, stimulated the maintenance of low leverage ratios, helping insulate companies from international crises.
Low inflation, however, posed a fiscal challenge. The loss of the inflation tax, combined with wage increases granted in the last months of high inflation proved a heavy burden to state governments and the federal government, and herald a few years of fiscal relaxation. The persistence of high interest rates, reflecting a lingering distrust about fiscal sustainability and the overall macroeconomic balance, further punished public accounts. As a consequence, the public sector was vulnerable to the Asian crisis, and particularly to the events following the failure of LTCM and events related to the Russian debt in 1998. Increased risk aversion by international investors rendered difficult to keep the pegging of the real. The strategy of trying to stem capital outflows through higher domestic interest rates quickly showed its limitations, stressed the fiscal outlook and ultimately led to the breakdown of the exchange rate system in early 1999.
The response of Brazil to the 1998 crisis was a new macroeconomic framework based on a flexible exchange rate, inflation targeting, and fiscal responsibility. Of these, the most difficult to achieve, as well as the most important, was a long overdue commitment to fiscal discipline. The new framework was introduced amid an unfavorable international environment, and against the initial skepticism of the International Monetary Fund, but has been long-lived and successful.
The 2000s
Fiscal discipline was quickly translated into the Fiscal Responsibility Law voted in 2000. The law provided an encompassing framework, applicable to the federal, state and local government. The Fiscal Responsibility Law-LRF, in addition to introduce sharp constraints on the financing of the public sector, including state-controlled financial institutions, provided for budgetary planning and disclosure rules. A hallmark of the LRF is the bi-monthly review of fiscal targets and budget execution, which drastically reduces the chance of large slippages. The law also rendered unlawful the bailing out of states by the federal government. It provided for limits to public debt, which reinforced those set in refinancing programs signed by the federal government and states in the late 1990s. A comprehensive and swiping electronic system was built to check the compliance of government to obligations, halting voluntary transfers when rules are not observed. Importantly, fiscal dominance was reduced by the focus on primary fiscal targets, rather than on nominal fiscal targets. This choice helped improve overall fiscal planning and relieved the pressure on monetary policy, strengthening its ability to deliver the inflation targets.
Fiscal targets were met every year to 2009. Moreover, in the wake of the election of President Lula, the target for the consolidated public primary surplus was raised to 4.5 per cent of GDP, a value observed in the following years. Unfortunately, the brunt of the fiscal adjustment fell on tax increases, owing to the rigidity of pensions and health care, as well as of public wages. As a consequence, the tax-to-GDP ratio for the consolidated public sector rose from around 25 per cent in the early 1990s, to around 35 per cent by the mid of the 2000s.
Improvements in the fiscal stance helped change the profile of public foreign debt after 2003. Old, expensive Brady bonds issued in the 1990s were replaced by cheaper and longer-term global issues; for the first time ever real-denominated bonds were issued abroad, as a way to familiarize a new class of investor to the local currency and eventually to local bonds. In 2005, all IMF loans were repaid in advance, the same happening to Paris Club loans, some of which dating back from the 1980s. The stock of foreign public debt was lengthened, with 2/3 of maturities beyond five years, and had dropped to US$ 96 billion by 2008 (Table 2 ). These improvements were translated into a much belated upgrade of the foreign federal debt to "investment grade" in 2008. (Figure 2 ). That growth was due mostly to private banks, in the wake of lower spreads and reforms that yielded stronger guarantees and liens over paychecks, cars and residences.
Credit and jobs helped create a new middle class. Poverty reduction, which improved significantly after the stabilization of the currency in 1994, was accelerated after 2005. Although the Gini coefficient remains high at 0.57, strong job creation, as well as transfer programs such as the Bolsa Família that benefits 12 million households, have contributed to reduce the number of very poor households (income below R$ 804) by 40 per cent since 2002 (Figure 3) . Meanwhile, the share of the middle class, i.e., households earning between R$ 1,150 and R$ 4,800 a month (US$ 8,500-32,500 a year), in the population has risen by more than 10 percentage points. Together with the upper classes, it accounts now for 70 per cent of households, from 53 per cent in 2003.
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The impact of income growth on consumption has been further fueled by more personal credit, especially paycheck loans, with strong reflex on the consumption of services and durable goods.
In sum, in mid 2008 Brazil enjoyed a growing economy, with a comfortable external balance, a much improved fiscal situation, and a watchful Central Bank. The country also experienced a surge in investment, reflected in a record number of IPOs. Fortunately, all these indicators, including credit, were still in a beginning-of-a-cycle position when the crisis hit.
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The crisis and the government response Figure 3 Income Distribution massive public works program. Both features created a favorable environment to Brazil. Together with the soundness of the Brazilian financial market and the Central Bank ability to respond to circumstances without wavering in its commitment to the floating exchange rate, this environment helped business people to quickly recover confidence and the government to use the fiscal room it had build, without jolting financial markets. In the occasion, the Central Bank also reinforced its vast international reserves with contingent lines with the US FED (US$ 30 billion) and the IMF. None of these lines were however used.
The government response to the global slowdown can be grouped into protection of financial markets and support to credit; full use of automatic stabilizers; and outright fiscal stimulus. The Central Bank played a paramount role in implementing the first group, while policies already in place responded for most of the second, and a mix of tax brakes, public-sector wage increases, and a pro-active stance of public banks accounted for the third. The ability of the country in successfully deploying theses tools, rather than their originality, was perhaps the big news about them.
Protection of financial markets
The Central Bank ensured the smooth operation of currency markets. This was based on more than US$ 200 billion in international reserves, and the judicious swap of part of them with domestic players. Central Bank interventions included US$ 24 billion in credit to exporters, outright sales of US$ 14.5 billion and swaps adding to US$ 33 billion (Table 3) . This strategy was predicated on the view that the external sector was fundamentally sound, and those who had borrowed from the Central Bank would be able to repay it in a few months. The provision of liquidity ensured that exports continued to flow, and that futures markets would not face undue turbulence; also the Central Bank could earn some income by selling dollars when the real was Ensuring liquidity in the immediate aftermath of Lehman's collapse was essential to avert an unnecessary crisis. In 2005-08, Brazilian companies had lengthened their debt through international bond issues. Nonetheless, in addition to the need of rolling over that debt, external bank credit still accounted for about US$ 97 billion in September 2008, and US$ 47 billion in domestic bank credit were supported by foreign lines. These funds amounted to 20 per cent of the total bank credit market, and the contraction of foreign credit made domestic lending based on foreign funds drop by US$ 38 billion between September 2008 and January 2009. Also, as international capital markets froze, Brazilian companies turned to domestic banks. The most striking case of this dislocation was the R$ 2 billion emergency loan granted by the federal savings bank to Petrobras. A result of this short run financial drying out was a sharp contraction of output in late 2008, as companies cut inventory and put workers on vacation.
The Central Bank channeled liquidity to small banks. In Brazil, small banks depend on funds from large banks, rather than the other way around, as traditionally in the US. As a consequence, they were squeezed when large corporations started to compete for funds from large banks. That had an immediate effect on medium-size companies, which are big employers and depended on smaller banks. In response, the Central Bank reduced reserve requirements by 40 per cent in October 2008, freeing R$ 100 million (3 per cent of GDP, since requirements amounted to 1/3 of Rates started to decline o n l y i n J a n u a r y 2009, after GDP had contracted close to 2 per c e n t a n d i n f l a t i o n expectations were tamed. The SELIC had dropped to 8.75 per cent by July 2009, when the relaxation cycle was complete. It was the first time in recent years that Brazil was able to respond to a slowdown in the world economy by relaxing rather than tightening monetary policy.
The Central Bank was comfortable to reduce rates because of the equilibrium in the domestic economy and the policy response of developed countries to the crisis. The very accommodative monetary policy in the United Stated created unusual liquidity in world markets, stimulating capital flows to Brazil and helping support the exchange rate and reduce inflationary pressure. This is, of course, a scenario radically different from those faced by Brazil in the 1980s, in 1995 (the so-called "Tequila crisis") or in 1998-2001, when capital outflows were the norm, often in the wake of a tightening in the US (Figure 6 ). It allowed the public sector to adopt a much more ambitious response than in previous crises.
A proactive role for the public sector was illustrated early on by the response to the problems of a handful of exporters caught off guard. As mentioned above, financial markets performed well during the crisis. Nonetheless, there were a few companies that faced very dangerous situations. In particular, two large exporters that had been unhappy with the appreciation trend of the real and high domestic interest rates, bought complex derivatives, betting on borrowing at lower interest rates against the risk of a large loss in the case of a major depreciation of the real. As the currency swung beyond any expected threshold, the contracts called for extremely punitive payments that exceeded by far the companies' export streams and caused severe cash flow problems. The government response, after checking that this was an idiosyncratic problem, was to induce each of the firms to merge with stronger competitors, with the financial help of the National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES). The strategy chastised controlling shareholders, while striving to preserve ongoing concerns. It was perceived as a portent of opportunities opened by the crisis, for allowing the creation of global powerhouses in the export markets of poultry and cellulose. The episode of derivatives also highlights strengths of Brazilian financial markets. Authorities could intervene firmly and timely because they had access to information, which included the individual name of final risk bearers of each contract. By inquiring in the clearing system (CETIP) where it is mandatory to register every over the counter contract, the Securities Exchange Commission (CVM) and the Central Bank were able to quickly map the exposure of all domestic derivatives. This stands in striking contrast with, for instance, the US, where authorities would know only the aggregate positions of banks. The review showed Brazilian authorities that large risks were concentrated on exposures of one type of contract offered by foreign banks offshore, facilitating the tailoring of the response. Also, because most companies knew that the Central Bank would not try to defend the currency, they were adequately hedged, requiring minimum liquidity provision to the futures market by the Central Bank.
Automatic stabilizers
In contrast with most developing countries, Brazil has strong demand stabilizers, anchored on sizeable social transfers. Pay-as-you-go pension payments amount to 9.2 per cent of GDP. About 40 million workers, in a 92 million working force contribute to the general pension system, while 6.5 million are enrolled in schemes for public employees, and 19 million are self employed in and out of the formal market and the roll of social security contributors. The general scheme pays about 23.5 million benefits a month, of which 1/3 referring to rural pensions with tenuous contributory factor. In addition, the social security pays 3.5 million old-age and disability minimum-revenue benefits (LOAS-RMV) amounting to R$ 20 billion. Unemployment insurance, although limited by high rotation and job informality, typically benefits more than 6 million people a year. A recent minimum wage setting mechanism helped support demand. The rule agreed in 2007 established that real wage increases should reflect per capita real GDP growth two years before. Confirmed by the decree n. 456/2009, it meant more than 5 per cent real growth for the minimum wage in 2009. The impact of this growth went well beyond formal employees earning the minimum wage for two reasons: pay levels in the informal market are linked to the minimum wage, because the duality of labor markets is related more to the payment of taxes than to wage levels; the floor of pensions and other benefits, comprised in the "broad labor compensation" monitored by the Central Bank, are also linked to it. 
Fiscal measures
Fiscal measures by the central government included reductions in taxes and increases in public servant wages and investment. Tax breaks ranged from the reduction in the federal VAT on industrial goods (IPI), to the introduction of new income tax brackets aimed at reducing the tax burden on the middle class. Also, the tax on the financial transaction IOF on loans and the corporate income tax due by companies involved with a new low-income housing program were cut down. Altogether, the direct fiscal stimulus amounted to about 0.5 per cent of GDP, with the following breakdown: R$ 5 billion (0.2 per cent of GDP) due to the change in income tax brackets; R$ 6 billion out of total IPI revenues of R$ 39 billion in 2008; R$ 2.5 billion related to IOF; R$ 0.2 billion related to the tax break for the real estate sector. The stimulus was effective in some sectors, such as the auto industry and home appliances: car production recovered to a record level of 3.1 million vehicles in 2009, making Brazil the fifth largest auto producer in the world that year.
The increase in public wages outpaced by far the expansion in public investment. Wages in the Executive branch rose by 16 per cent in the Executive branch. Together with an increase in positions, it led the payroll to rise from 4.35 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 4.84 per cent of GDP in 2009. This 0.5 per cent of GDP increase was larger than the combined effect of automatic stabilizers, although it benefited a much smaller group of people. It was also larger than the R$ 11 billion expansion in Central Government investments, notwithstanding the prominence given to projects in the PAC-Growth Accelerating investment program, especially those benefiting from the PPI allowance that excluded certain Central Government investments from the primary target (PPI outlays increased from R$ 7.8 billion to R$ 16 billion).
3 Indeed, despite great managerial effort and absence of fiscal constraints in the case of the PPI, investments by the Central Government amounted to just a bit more than 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2009.
Significant part of the fiscal stimulus was done through public enterprises. Public investments by Eletrobras, the federal electricity holding company, reached R$ 3.6 billion, while the company, often as a minority partner, participates in PAC projects to the top of R$ 41 billion. Petrobras invested R$ 50 billion in the first three quarters of 2009 (1.6 per cent of annual GDP), as part of its US$ 174 billion investment plan for 2009-13. Investment by the federal government and Petrobras accounts for more than 15 per cent of total investment, according with the Ministry of Finance. However, despite its role in the PAC and in the government public agenda, Petrobras has recently been excluded from the fiscal figures of the consolidated public sector, because Brazil adopted the practice used in most developed countries with regard to public enterprises producing market goods. Traditionally, Petrobras contribution to the consolidated public sector primary balance had been in the range of 0.4-0.5 per cent of GDP. (Figure 7) . Banco do Brasil moved aggressively in retail, in addition to keep its traditional role in farming. It acquired two medium-size banks, one in a rescue operation and the other put for sale by a state government. Banco do Brasil took full advantage of lower interest rates and the acquisitions to increase its consolidated lending by 33 per cent in 2009. The savings bank Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) expanded its credit by more than 50 per cent, increasing its market share by 2.3 percentage points to 8.8 per cent, in a expanding market. The balance sheet of BNDES more than doubled vis-à-vis 2007, with large exposures to private and public companies, in support of outright investments as well as several mergers and acquisitions. Disbursements totaled R$136
Additional stimulus came from public banks through vigorous credit expansion
The PPI was introduced in 2005 as a pilot project in which investments with ascertained rates of return would be excluded from the fiscal targets under the argument that the country was not facing a liquidity constraint anymore and therefore fiscal targets should focus on solvency. As such, if an investment could bring more in the long run than the cost of financing it, it was worth doing as long as this financing were available. At the beginning the PPI allowance amounted to R$ 3 billion a year, with the possibility of replacing projects that did not perform adequately with new ones. Abundant credit also propped up a new housing program and helped buffer states against the decline in federal transfers. The "minha casa-minha vida" low-income housing program was set up to provide R$ 6 billion in subsidized loans to developers and households. Although disbursements were negligible in 2009, projects for 275 thousand houses were approved, creating great expectations in the construction sector, which had not benefited from significant public funds since the 1980s, when macroeconomic instability led to the bankruptcy of the existing financing system (BNH). 4 The federal government also offered about R$ 2 billion in loans from public banks to states facing shortfalls in VAT receipts and lower federal transfers, and lifted their borrowing ceilings by R$ 10 billion, facilitating loans from multilateral financial institutions.
On balance, the crisis strengthened the presence of public companies, which was already significant, especially in energy and banking. Petrobras is dominant in domestic oil and gas production, virtually a monopolist in refining and an important player in fuel distribution. 
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Remaining risks and structural issues
The success in responding to the crisis highlights the importance of fiscal issues in Brazil and
The resulting bad loans remained in the financial sector until 2001, when they were moved to the resolution company EMGEA. These risks may be more related to the belief that the success of the fiscal stimulus and credit relaxation during the crisis vindicates a larger permanent role for the public sector, rather than being an evidence that years of effort allowed the country to successfully deploy countercyclical measures, which were supported by the exceptional combination of lax monetary policy in developed countries and sustained demand in China. Diverse perceptions of the meaning of the quick recovery can thus lead to different policy choices in coming years. These could favor demand stimulus and increased reliance on public companies as the way to long-term growth, or could keep the emphasis on promoting additional structural changes through institutions and the fostering of competition in a free-market economy. They will also be instrumental to reach the long yearned goal of lower interest rates. The decline in interst rates, if correctly done, could unleash a new wave of investments. If forced inappropriately, it could lead to capital flight and stagnation. The following paragraphs review the economic outlook and risks in Brazil, and suggest a direction for a new generation of reforms that may help achieve those goals safely. sheet raises flags: most constraints on lending to public companies imposed in the 1990s and early 2000s were lifted, while large exposures to private companies over a broad range of sectors were built. Abstracting from legitimate views on industrial policy, these actions have a clear fiscal bias, because they required extensive support from the National Treasury and brought back a practice of money-creation that had been stopped in the 1980s. Although the increase in the Treasury exposure did not affect the non-financial public sector net debt figures, because it was effected trough the purchase of BNDES subordinated debt rather than outright capital injections, it impacted gross debt. Of the R$ 233 billion increase in the National Treasury gross debt in 2009 (+15 per cent, or 5 per cent of GDP), R$ 102 billion (3 per cent of GDP) arose from the financing of public banks.
Economic outlook and risks
Public spending will keep the pressure on the external accounts. The strong pace of household consumption, fueled by fiscal and credit policies, as well as a sharp increase in profit and dividend remittances, has created a current account deficit. This increase appears to be related to financial needs of international companies rather than to any weakness in the Brazilian economy, as it has been contemporary to higher foreign direct investment inflows and reserves levels (the BOP showed a US$ 46 billion surplus in 2009, with a financial account surplus of US$ 70 billion). Nonetheless, risks may be accumulating, considering that imports have doubled in quantum since 2006, while the quantum of exports has remained stable. More than half of the increase in exports receipts in the last five years is owed to price increases, while import prices have been very tame. A change in the terms of trade, often contemporary with a global increase in interest rates, could require an important adjustment in the economy. Past experience and the dynamics of imports On the bright side, Brazil can count on new oil discoveries and a steady demand from China. Brazil can be a reliable long-term supplier of minerals, food, construction materials and basic industrial goods to China. With regard to oil, the reserves in the "pré-sal" province are in the 50-80 billion barrels range (Figure 9 ). Production there could reach 2 million barrels a day by 2017. Most of this oil would be available for exports, generating up to US$ 50 billion a year in income (1-2 per cent of GDP). In addition, minimum domestic content requirements on equipments and services supplied to oil companies in the pré-sal will have a multiplier effect, 9 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 remembering that a third of the annual R$ 80 billion investment program of Petrobras is linked to the drilling and production of oil. The expertise and scale local suppliers will obtain by servicing the pré-sal will likely help create new streams of exports. The challenge will be to walk the fine line between industrial promotion and inefficiency.
The scope for further structural reforms
Reforms adopted since 2003 have proved effective, as demonstrated by the expansion in real estate investment since 2005. First-generation reforms from the 1990s (e.g., in oil drilling, telecomm, banking) yielded benefits throughout the 2000s. These, have increasingly been accompanied by those from a second generation of reforms implemented after 2003 (Table 4) . One of the most effective reforms in the latter group was the one dealing with real estate. This projectfinance inspired reform segregated real estate projects against developers' corporate bankruptcy and other risks, providing much more security to buyers and financers. 5 Coupled with the relaxation of monetary policy and earlier changes in lending rules (e.g., strengthening of repossession of financed houses), it unlocked a huge market, reviving the construction sector even before the "minha casa-minha vida". New house financing rose from 30,000 in the 1990s and early 2000s, to 300,000 more recently, supporting several IPOs of developers. The market is still small, with annual disbursements of just R$ 30 billion, and the stock of mortgages amounting to just around R$ 105 billion (i.e., 3 per cent of GDP), but its potential is large (Figure 10 ). Medium-term fiscal spending targets, together with thirdgeneration reforms can reduce aggregate risks, stimulating idiosync r a t i c r i s k s a n d i n v e s t m e n t s . S u c h spending targets would help agents to assess the impact of fiscal impulses to the aggregate demand a n d t h e a m o u n t o f distortion caused by future taxes. It would thus be a natural improvement over the existing commitment to the primary surplus target. Third-generation reforms could focus on the refinement of existing c h e c k -a n d -b a l a n c e sy stems, strengthening -----5 In the 1990s many individual investors lost money because constructors would mix resources from several projects in a common account. Because tax and labor liabilities would have precedence in any bankruptcy situation, problems in one project would quickly affect all projects.
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The stock is so small also because the residual, unfunded mortgages from the 1970-90 have been transferred to the resolution fund EMGEA. regulatory agencies and external control of government decisions. This would respond to the want of better coordination among agencies representing stakeholders that often unduly increase the risk surrounding private and public investment and help improve the effectiveness of public spending. It would, for instance, address the incentives for agencies responsible for licenses to procrastinate, rather than give positive or negative responses; or the problem that obtaining a stay from a court (mandado de segurança) is rather easy, while deciding on the merit can drag for decades. Improving the governance of macro-processes in the public sector needs not hamper freedom or growth, but rather make rules more clear and objective. Absent that, the tendency would be a sliding towards bullying agencies and the return to discretionary and unaccountable polices from the Executive branch and close-door decisions by public companies.
That two-pronged approach could pave the way to lower interest rates. Although rates are below the peaks of the 1990s or early 2000s, they remain surprisingly high, distorting investment and labor decisions and creating incentives for rent seeking, such as below-market rate loans from BNDES. A frontloaded effort in the fiscal would thus reduce the implicit subsidy in BNDES loans, which, at R$ 10 billion, adds up to almost the cost of the Bolsa Família. 7 It would also help shave government interest payments, which are in excess of 5 per cent of GDP, freeing resources ahead. It is intuitive that the current policy mix of tight monetary policy and expanding fiscal policy is inefficient in an environment where growth quickly translates into price increases because fiscal uncertainty weakens the supply response to shocks in aggregate demand, and large companies borrowing from BNDES are insulated from Central Bank rates. Hence, the good financial -----7 This amount is estimating considering a 5 per cent subsidy on a R$ 200 billion balance sheet.
indicators currently surrounding the public debt should not be mistaken for a license to spend, even if credit default swaps on Brazilian debts are priced below those on Italy and Spain (e.g., CDS premium of 131 bps for Brazil, versus around 180-240 for those countries). A balanced and sound decline in rates would strengthen Brazilian companies on the whole and probably reduce the need for the government to promote "national champions" through official channels, as well as the incentive for firms to share risks with the government through loans from public banks.
Sub-national governments provide interesting experiences regarding better quality in public spending. An often overlooked consequence of the institutional changes triggered by price stability was the pressure on subnational governments to focus on better service delivery. Without the smoke of inflation, subject to the Fiscal Responsibility Law, and with little room to issue debt, state governments changed their way to do business, focusing on core areas such as health, education and public security, which are essential to long-term growth. Increased commitment to transparency, stronger compliance rules, and better internal controls were promoted, together with more effective rapports with controlling agencies.
8 New, ambitious programs for automating and integrating taxes, spending and their accounting using corporate systems (e.g., SAP/Oracle ERPs) are also under way.
Given the excellent financial infrastructure of Brazil, further confidence on fiscal and macroeconomic balances could facilitate the tapping of local capital markets. Clearing, custody, as well as trading and underwriting technology and systems are state of the art in Brazil. The Brazilian Exchange BOVESPA is one of the four most valuable exchanges in the world, and the overall market capitalization of listed companies is at par with that of Spain and Germany. Over the counter clearing institutions are also nimble and secure. Pension funds, investment funds, and insurance companies have thrived since the reforms of the early 2000s, creating a robust and increasingly well regulated sector of institutional investors eager to find new outlets for their savings. Thus, the share of capital market debt in the balance sheet of industries doubled in 2006-07 and amounted to 8 per cent of GDP in 2008, while bank loans excluding those using earmarked/public funds have stagnated. With less aggregate risk and the ensuing lower interest rates, the BOVESPA plan to list up to 200 new companies in the coming years could become reality and dramatically facilitate the financing of corporations and infrastructure, sustaining growth.
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Concluding remarks
The success of the response to the crisis validates the policy choices of the last 15 years. The success in deploying anti-cyclical instruments should not be confused with a license to weaken the fiscal stance in the medium term and expand public companies in a thoughtless way, but rather be seen as a sign of the potential of third-generation reforms. Sedimentation is one of the strengths of Brazil, which helped consolidate the reforms of the 1990s and promote a new round of changes in 2003-06, all along boosting the confidence in the policy formulation and implementation process. This cycle should be extended in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, through the elimination of any doubts about the country's solvency. This would be especially favorable to growth, considering the new opportunities opened up by the pré-sal oil discoveries, long-term trends in international trade and capital flows, as well as the large market driven by a burgeoning middle class. Discipline on pubic financing of banks should not be weakened, in light of past experiences -----8 In Rio de Janeiro, oil revenues, for instance, are channeled to the public servants pension fund, insulating the rest of the government from the fluctuations in oil prices, and guaranteeing great transparency in the use of these receipts. Better governance has also helped the nature conservancy fund FECAM financed with a small share of those oil revenues to deliver consistent results, with lower agency costs. Also, on-line disclosure of every payment and other measures to improve transparency and predictability have allowed the government to expand partnerships with the private sector and lower acquisition costs significantly. and of the vitality of domestic capital markets. Instead, the focus should be on improving the quality of public spending and regulatory agencies, and on developing a new framework to reinforce instances of social control, to foster accountability without unduly slowing down investment projects. Confidence in the fiscal outlook, together with yet more clarity on the functioning of institutions, would help avoid overlapping demands from licensing bodies and stimulate greater use of capital markets, fostering investment and growth. 
APPENDIX
